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Abstract
We show that internal funds play a particular role in the regulation of bank capital,
which has not received much attention, yet. A bank’s decision on loan supply and
capital structure determines its immediate bankruptcy risk as well as the future
availability of internal funds. These internal funds in turn determine a bank’s future
costs of external finance and its future vulnerability to bankruptcy risks. Using
a partial equilibrium model, we study how internal funds affect these intra- and
intertemporal links. Moreover, our positive analysis identifies the effects of risk-
weighted capital-to-asset ratios, liquidity coverage ratios and regulatory margin calls
on the dynamics of internal funds and thus loan supply and bank stability. Only
regulatory margin calls or large liquidity coverage ratios achieve bank stability for
all risk levels, but for large risks a bank will stop credit intermediation.
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1. Introduction
A major objective of bank regulation is to promote the stability of single banks and
the banking system as a whole. Regulators pursue this objective indirectly, primarily
through influencing the decisions of banks to grant loans and to take risks. Studies of
the effects of regulations on these decisions typically focus on the differences between
equity and debt, particularly uninsured deposits and other short-term debt. Such debt
serves the liquidity needs of investors and provides incentive-compatible intermediation
when the bank has a comparative advantage in allocating or managing investments.
However, such debt may also expose banks to the risk of bankruptcy.1 Equity makes
banks less vulnerable to risks but either impairs the provision of liquidity services by
banks or increases their costs.2 As a bank’s ability to raise funds for granting risky
loans depends on the value of the liquidity services it provides, a bank with more
equity assumes lower bankruptcy risks but also grants fewer loans.
This trade-off is a key concern for regulators. However, the account is incomplete as
equity is not only associated with funds raised externally from shareholders. Internal
funds are another form of equity funding. They are the financial resources a bank can
command through managing assets originated in a previous period. These resources
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correspond either to the current returns of these assets or to the amount a bank
can raise externally against their future returns, net of any debt immediately due for
payment. In the present paper we shed light on the role of internal funds for regulation
by developing a dynamic model of a banking firm which can use these funds in addition
to funds raised externally from depositors and shareholders. We argue that internal
funds are a form of equity that renders the trade-off between bank stability and loan
supply more subtle, with some important implications for the effects of regulatory
instruments on banks’ risk taking and loan supply.
The aim of our paper is to identify conditions under which a regulatory instrument
changes a bank’s decision on capital structure and loan supply over time and in which
way. To conduct this positive analysis, we consider a partial-equilibrium, two-period
banking model with exogenous credit risk and limited commitment. At the beginning
of each period, the banker determines the bank’s portfolio and capital structure. He
decides on how much debt, external equity and internal funds is used to either grant
risky loans or invest in risk-free assets. These decisions render the bank’s funding
liquidity in each possible state of the world and thus the bank’s stability is endogenous,
despite exogenous credit risk. The capital structure is considered to be safe if the bank
is always able to repay its depositors at the end of a period regardless how large loan
returns are. However, if the bank raises too much debt which cannot be repaid once
loans perform poorly, its capital structure is risky. In this case, the bank defaults at
the end of a period if bank returns turn out to be low. Such default is costly as the
liquidation of bank assets adversely affects their value.
In a first step, we analyze the impact of internal funds on the bank’s portfolio and
capital decision in the absence of any regulatory requirement. We show that, provided
loans exhibit only moderate risks, they generate some internal funds in the future
even when financial conditions turn out to bad. Granting more loans than justified by
their net present value today will boost internal funds available tomorrow. This eases
a possible future financial constraint and allows the bank to be safe at all times. Such
excess loan supply today followed by a credit crunch tomorrow if conditions get worse
are jointly caused by the possibility of future funding problems.3
Provided loans exhibit considerable risks, the bank will face strong funding problems
should loans perform poorly in the future. This is because internal funds will be
negative, implying a debt overhang. Even a forward-looking bank will cope with these
funding problems only when they materialize. The bank will then adopt a fragile
capital structure, raising funds primarily via new deposits. However, the risk of a
future default as a result of implementing such a capital structure later may already
reduce the value of loans granted today. Therefore a bank grants fewer loans today
than justified by their net present value. If these loans perform poorly in the future,
the bank will gamble for resurrection.
Against this background, we consider three regulatory instruments and their effects
on a bank’s decision on capital structure and loan supply. Risk-weighted capital-to-
asset ratios (CAR) are common and already in use in banking regulation for quite a
while. With the Basel III framework, new liquidity requirements are put in place. In
this paper we have a closer look at a liquidity coverage ratio (LCR), which requires
banks to cover their expected net cash outflows over some time period by a certain
amount of high quality liquid assets. Moreover, we analyze regulatory margin calls
(RMC) which is a theoretical concept proposed by Hart and Zingales (2011) and as
such not currently applied in practice. RMC are intended to work as follows. When
markets’ assessment of a bank’s probability of default increases above a threshold set
by the regulator, shareholders would have to recapitalize their bank. If they don’t, the
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regulator would have to perform a stress test and, if this test confirms a risk to the
bank’s stability, would have to take over the bank, replace its management and wipe
out shareholders.
We find that provided credit risks are not too large, CAR amplify the volatility of
loan supply. The regulation lowers the funding liquidity of loans, especially in times
that are already financially difficult. A bank then makes provisions today by aiming at
generating more internal funds for the future. This implies supplying even more loans
today. A more pronounced credit crunch in bad times following a stronger loan supply
in good times occurs even with risk-weights being constant over time and financial
conditions.4 With considerable credit risks, boosting internal funds may be too costly
though such that the bank either adopts a fragile capital structure at all dates or stops
credit intermediation altogether.
LCR do not affect loan supply as long as the bank chooses a safe capital structure.
To meet the regulatory requirement, it can simply issue additional deposits to be
invested in a risk-free asset until the required ratio is achieved. Risk-taking becomes
less attractive though with LCR because loans become less valuable in building-up
internal funds with a fragile capital structure. The banker rather prefers to build up
internal funds with a safe capital structure even if this implies a tight restriction on
loan supply. As a result, LCR tend to increase bank stability at the cost of a higher
volatility of loan supply. Sufficiently large LCR may induce the bank to choose a safe
capital structure even for large credit risks.
Given the supervisory consequences of RMC, the incentives to eliminate the risk of
default at all times are aligned between banker and bank shareholders. In the context
of our model, bank stability will thus prevail for all credit risks. The downside of RMC
is that the banker grants loans only as long as their funding liquidity is still sufficiently
large. Therefore, RMC do not alter the volatility in loan supply for moderate credit
risks. For considerable credit risks, however, RMC increase bank stability at the cost
of a stop in credit intermediation.
The analytical backbones of our model are taken from dynamic banking models such
as Bucher, Dietrich, and Hauck (2013), which we have augmented for our purpose by
including external equity capital. With its focus on banks using deposits, external
equity as well as internal funds to make loans in a dynamic setting, our paper is
most closely related to Repullo and Suarez (2013) and Hyun and Rhee (2011). Using
an infinite horizon model with overlapping generations, Repullo and Suarez (2013)
discuss the dynamic implications of capital structure decisions for a bank’s future
ability to supply credit. In Hyun and Rhee (2011), deposits as well as internal funds
are exogenous leaving no room for strategic action to boost future loan supply. Both
papers concentrate on the effects of capital requirements. We add to these papers in
two ways. First, we investigate a scenario in which banks not only vary their capital
structure but also the volume of their loan supply to strategically improve future
funding conditions. Second, we evaluate the consequences of a richer set of regulatory
instruments.
Our model predicts that loan supply can be volatile and excessive at times. This
prediction can also be found in Lorenzoni (2008). In contrast to this paper, we ex-
plicitly consider credit intermediation by banks. Finally, Dietrich and Hauck (2012)
analyze the impact of different bail-out schemes on bank loan supply and risk-taking
while Blum (2008) compares risk-weighted capital-to-asset ratios with a leverage ratio,
showing that the latter may rectify disincentives for banks misreporting their risks to
the supervisor. In contrast to ours, these frameworks feature a one-period world, in
which banks are not able to strategically acquire internal funds over time.
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We abstain in our analysis from looking into possible interactions of multiple regu-
latory instruments. While there is a need for research in this area as knowledge of such
interactions is still rather limited (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2016), a
prerequisite for a good understanding of the combined effects of multiple regulations
is to have a good understanding of the implications of each regulatory instrument in
isolation. Given this focus, we deliberately do not consider an explicit welfare measure
and turn off general equilibrium considerations.5 There are no feedback effects such as
from a financial accelerator. Papers in this area include Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010)
and Meh and Moran (2010). These papers, however, do not allow for constraints that
are binding in only a subset of the possible states of the world. Moreover, they do
not explore the theoretical implications of different regulatory instruments for the
dynamics of loan supply and bank stability.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the setup of
the model, solves the benchmark model and discusses the assumptions of our model
environment. Section 3 explores the effects of CAR, LCR and RMC. Section 4 con-
cludes.
2. The Model
2.1. Setup
Consider a bank that exists for two periods, or three dates t ∈ {0, 1, 2}, respectively.
The bank is managed by a profit maximizing banker, who possesses no own funds. At
the beginning of each period, at t = 0 and t = 1, funding can be provided by investors.
They are competitively organized, have plenty of funds, and access to a risk-free, zero-
return storage technology. Although investors as a group exist throughout all periods,
a single investor lives for one period only. Banker and investors are risk-neutral and
have no time preference.
At t = 0 and t = 1, the banker invests the amount at ≥ 0 in a short-term asset
and grants lt ≥ 0 as loans. While the short-term asset is risk-free and generates a
zero net return in each period, loan earnings are risky. They depend on the economic
conditions at the beginning of the second period (see Figure 1). At this date t = 1,
conditions are either good or bad. They are good with probability p1 ∈ [0.6, 1).
First-period loans granted at t = 0 earn a high return vg > 1 at t = 1 under good
economic conditions.6 If, however, conditions are bad, some loans will default while
others will delay, resulting in no returns at t = 1 and low returns vb < 1 at t = 2.
Define ∆ := vg−vb, and let µ := p1vg+(1−p1)vb be the expected return of first-period
loans.7 We assume µ > 1 and rewrite the state-dependent returns as
vg = µ+ (1− p1) ∆, (1)
vb = µ− p1∆. (2)
For a given µ, a larger ∆ reflects a higher mean preserving spread and thus higher
credit risk.8 The return of second-period loans granted at t = 1 is also assumed to
depend on the economic conditions prevailing at this date. If conditions are good, the
return will be rg > 1 at t = 2.
9 Otherwise, loans will earn either a small return rb < rg
at that date (with probability p2 ∈ [0.6, 1)) or nothing at all.10 We let the expected
net returns of second-period loans be positive even in the bad state, i.e. p2rb > 1.
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(vb, 0)1− p2
(vb, rb)p21− p1
(vg, 0) (0, rg)
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t = 0 t = 1 t = 2
Figure 1. Loan earnings (per unit).
Note: At each node, the first entry refers to loans granted at t = 0 and the second entry to loans granted at
t = 1.
Following the literature on incomplete contracts in the spirit of Hart and Moore
(1994), we assume that there is a contract enforcement problem between the banker
and investors. Bank assets will generate their returns only if the banker employs his
specific skills but it is impossible to contractually commit to employing these skills on
behalf of investors when investments are made. This gives the banker an incentive to
renegotiate or even refuse repayments to investors once he has invested their funds.
According to Diamond and Rajan (2000, 2001), uninsured demandable deposits
eliminate this incentive as any attempt to renegotiate repayments to depositors would
trigger an immediate bank run destroying bank assets. The drawback of deposits is
that a run occurs when the bank’s prospective earnings fall short of depositors’ claims.
To prevent such runs, a banker can issue equity shares.11 The value of equity corre-
lates with the value of the bank and can thus serve as a buffer against fluctuations in
loan earnings. The downside of equity is that its value to shareholders is smaller than
the value of the bank, which may cause a financial constraint for the banker. This
is due to the banker’s specific skills and the insufficient disciplining effect of equity,
allowing the banker to retain some share of bank profits.
In our model, we account for these contract enforcement problems between a banker
and investors by making the following assumptions. At the beginning of each period,
the banker can raise external funds by issuing deposits and equity. At t = 1, the banker
additionally commands internal funds depending on the outcome of his investment
decisions in the first period and the state of the economy. The banker will repay the
face value of deposits δt at the end of the respective period whenever he is able to do
so. Otherwise, depositors will run on the bank. We assume that such run destroys the
value of all bank assets (up to some small, negligible amount).
Provided there is no bank run, the banker pays shareholders a share 1 − λ ≤ 0.5
of the bank’s cash flow, i.e. loan earnings and returns on the safe asset net of any
liabilities vis-à-vis depositors payable at this date. To focus on the interesting cases,
in which the resulting conflict of interest between investors and the banker at least
potentially imposes a restriction on the banker’s behavior, we restrict attention to
(1 − λ)p2rb < 1 and (1 − λ)p1vg < 1. Hence, for each loan granted either at t = 0 or
in the bad situation at t = 1, the amount the banker can pledge to shareholders falls
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short of the amount he needs to refinance the loan. Accordingly, in these instances the
banker relies on deposits at least to some extent.
For the banker, acquiring and maintaining his specific skills to collect bank asset
returns is associated with private and non-verifiable costs. He incurs these costs at
the date when the assets are originated. The risk-free asset is rather easy to manage
at a cost normalized to zero. The costs associated with loans are an increasing and
convex function c of the loan volume lt with c(0) = c
′(0) = 0. This assumption is based
on the notion that loans, though yielding identical returns, differ in the complexity
of their respective underlying projects. Hence, the banker starts to grant loans to
those projects which are the easiest to manage and adds the least complex among the
remaining projects first to his portfolio.
As everyone is risk neutral, the efficient, first-best loan volume for the first period
lfb0 is given by µ−1 = c′(l
fb
0 ). For loans granted at the beginning of the second period,
the first-best loan volume depends on the economic conditions at t = 1. If they are
good, the first-best loan volume lfb1,g satisfies rg − 1 = c′(l
fb
1,g). Otherwise, the first-best
loan volume lfb1,b is given by p2rb − 1 = c
′(lfb1,b). Note that since the costs to the banker
are non-verifiable, a third party cannot tell whether the lending volume is actually
efficient.
2.2. Benchmark
As the banker is risk neutral and has no time preference, his objective at any date is
to maximize the profits he expects to make by the end of the second period, subject
to his budget constraints. Profits are given by the loan earnings and asset returns
collected at the end of that period, net of payments to investors payable at this date
and less the portfolio management costs incurred in each period.
At the beginning of a period, the banker decides on how much funds to raise ex-
ternally from depositors and from shareholders, which capital structure to implement,
and how to invest the available external and internal funds. The banker’s decisions
determine the mode m in which the bank is operated. Looking at the entire potential
lifespan of the bank, three modes of operation can be distinguished. In the ”safe” mode
S, the banker makes sure that he is always able to repay deposits at the next date,
irrespective of the magnitude of bank earnings. In this mode, there is no risk of a bank
run, even if bad economic conditions delay first-period loan returns and second-period
loans turn out to yield nothing at all. In the ”risky” mode R, the banker accepts a run
in this worst possible scenario in the second period. In the ”failure” mode F , the bank
experiences a run already at the end of the first period should economic conditions be
bad. Thus, the terms safe, risky and failure refer to the status of the bank at t = 1
under bad economic conditions. Under good conditions at this date, a run will never
happen because loan returns are neither delayed nor do they fall short of the initial
outlay. Each mode m ∈ {S,R,F} involves certain restrictions on the quantity of loans
a bank can grant throughout its existence. These restrictions are driven by the bank’s
internal funds, i.e. the financial resources a banker commands by managing assets and
liabilities originated in the past.
Our next step is to spell out the restrictions for each mode. Then, we characterize
and explain the behavior of the banker by applying the principle of backward induc-
tion. Note that with perfect competition among investors, they provide funds to the
bank amounting to what they expect the banker to repay. Hence, raising funds for
investments in the risk-free asset will neither increase the banker’s profits nor improve
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his ability to grant loans at any date. Storage can thus not serve a precautionary
function and liquidity hoarding will not take place, as an investment in the risk-free
asset always has to be funded by an equivalent amount of deposits. We thus disregard
the safe asset in the benchmark situation.
Suppose the banker wishes to operate in the safe mode S by avoiding a bank run
at all times. There will be limited scope for external funding through deposits in this
case, particularly when earnings are uncertain. The resulting budget constraints at
t = 1 are
(rg − 1) l1,g + λ (vgl0 − δ0) ≥ 0, (3)
[(1− λ) p2rb − 1] l1,b + (vbl0 − δ0) ≥ 0. (4)
Constraint (3) refers to good economic conditions at t = 1. Loans granted at this
date are safe, allowing the banker to borrow against their full prospective return rg
from depositors without risking a run. Accordingly, the funding liquidity of these loans
is given by their expected net value rg − 1 to depositors, see the first term in (3). It is
positive. The second term in (3) represents the bank’s internal funds at t = 1 in the
good economic state. They are also positive and reflect the banker’s ability to retain a
share λ of accrued earnings vgl0 from first-period loans after repaying the face value of
deposits δ0. From (3), we can already conclude that the safe mode S does not restrict
loans at t = 1 as long as economic conditions are good.
Constraint (4) applies under bad conditions at t = 1. Second-period loans then may
fail to yield a return, leaving no scope for deposits. Instead, the banker must seek
external funding from shareholders, who receive only a share 1 − λ of loan earnings.
The resulting funding liquidity of second-period loans, captured by the first term in
(4), is negative. Hence, these loans are characterized by a funding gap, so that the
bank cannot operate safely unless it possesses internal funds at t = 1. According to
the second term in (4), internal funds will be available if the funding liquidity vbl0
of delayed first-period loan earnings exceeds the repayment δ0 to initial depositors at
t = 1.
At t = 0, the budget constraint for the safe mode S reads
l0 ≤ δ0 + p1 (1− λ) (vgl0 − δ0) , (5)
because initial depositors expect to receive δ0 in the safe mode, whereas initial share-
holders can expect to receive a share 1− λ of those earnings in excess of δ0, that are
not delayed at t = 1. By definition, there are no internal funds at this stage.
Constraint (5) together with (3) and (4) result in the major trade-off associated
with the safe mode S, given by
l1,b ≤ lmax1 with lmax1 = ψl0 =
µ−1−λp1∆
1−(1−λ)p1
1−(1−λ)p2rb l0. (6)
Constraint (6) says that the volume l1,b of second-period loans in the bad state is
restricted and that its upper bound is linearly dependent on the volume l0 of first-
period loans. The parameter ψ measures the financial leeway that the banker gains by
increasing his loan portfolio by one unit at t = 0. It is given by the ratio of the bank’s
internal funds at t = 1 under bad economic conditions (numerator) to the funding
gap of loans granted at t = 1 (denominator). Internal funds at t = 1, and thus ψ, are
negatively related to the risk ∆ of first-period loans. If ∆ is small, delayed returns of
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first-period loans in the bad state are rather large implying that ψ is positive. Then,
first-period loans generate internal funds under bad economic conditions at t = 1.
These internal funds can serve to close the funding gap of second-period loans. The
highest feasible volume lmax1 of second-period loans is higher, the more loans have been
granted at t = 0. If the risk ∆ is too large, ψ is negative at t = 1. First-period loans
then generate a debt overhang in the bad state at t = 1. As a consequence, the safe
mode is unavailable and we can define ∆ψ := µ−1λp1 as the largest risk ∆ for which the
banker can still operate safely.
In the risky mode R, the banker accepts that a bank run occurs at the end of the
second period should first-period loan earnings be delayed and second-period loans
turn out to yield no return at all. Compared to the safe mode, this alters the budget
constraint at t = 1 in the bad state to
(p2rb − 1) l1,b + (p2vbl0 − δ0) ≥ 0. (7)
This constraint differs from (4) in two respects. First, the risky mode improves the
funding liquidity of second-period loans by allowing for deposits instead of equity
funding. As a result, the funding liquidity is positive, see the first term in (7). Second,
according to the second term in (7), there are less internal funds at t = 1. The reason
here is that a run may destroy earnings of first-period loans, which lowers their funding
liquidity.
The risky mode’s budget constraint at t = 1 in the good state and at t = 0 are
identical to (3) and (5), respectively, because a run happens neither during the first
period nor in the second period under good conditions. Consequently, we can combine
(5) with (3) and (7) to obtain
l1,b ≥ −
µ−1−λp1∆
1−(1−λ)p1
−(1−p2)(µ−p1∆)
p2rb−1 l0. (8)
Similarly to (6), the denominator in (8) reflects the funding liquidity of second-period
loans under bad economic conditions whereas the numerator reflects internal funds at
t = 1. If the latter are positive, the risky mode does not restrict second-period loans.
If, however, internal funds are negative, there is again a trade-off between first and
second-period loans. The more loans the banker has granted at date t = 0, the higher
is the debt overhang at t = 1 under bad conditions so that the banker must grant
more loans and borrow against them at this date to keep the bank in operation.
In the failure mode F , depositors will run on the bank if they learn that the economic
conditions at t = 1 will be bad, forcing the bank to immediately cease operation. While
the failure of the bank at t = 1 in the bad state does not affect its budget constraint
at t = 1 in the good state, which is still given by (3), the budget constraint at the
beginning of the first period changes to
l0 ≤ p1d0 + p1 (1− λ) (vgl0 − δ0) , (9)
because depositors can expect to get a repayment from the bank in the good state
only.
Throughout the bank’s existence, the banker compares the relative costs and bene-
fits of the available modes and opts for the mode that maximizes his expected profit.
Applying backward induction and indicating optimal values by an asterisk, we obtain
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Proposition 1. The banker’s optimal decisions on the mode of operation and bank
lending at t = 0 and t = 1 are characterized by
A : m∗ = S, l∗0 = l
fb
0 , l
∗
1,b = l
fb
1,b if ∆ ≤ ∆
A,
B : m∗ = S, l∗0 = lS0 > l
fb
0 , l
∗
1,b = ψl
S
0 < l
fb
1,b if ∆ ∈
(
∆A, ∆B
]
,
C : m∗ = R, l∗0 = lR0 < l
fb
0 , l
∗
1,b = l
fb
1,b if ∆ ∈
(
∆B, ∆C
]
,
D : m∗ = R, l∗0 = lmax0 < l
fb
0 , l
∗
1,b = l
fb
1,b if ∆ ∈
(
∆C , ∆D
]
,
E : m∗ = F , l∗0 = lF0 < l
fb
0 , l
∗
1,b = 0 if ∆ > ∆
D,
with all critical values being defined in the appendix.
Proof. See appendix.
The proposition states that depending on the risk ∆ of first-period loans, the banker
chooses between five strategies. While all strategies lead to a first-best volume lfb1,g of
second-period loans under good economic conditions, they differ with regard to loans
granted at t = 0 and in the bad state at t = 1.
Strategy A is to operate safely and to lend according to the first-best at all dates
and in any state. This strategy maximizes expected profits as it avoids inefficient loan
volumes as well as inefficient bank runs. Therefore, the banker implements it whenever
he can. Strategy A is available as long as the risk ∆ of first-period loans is rather small.
In this case, internal funds generated with first-best lending lfb0 in the first period will
fully cover the funding gap associated with first-best lending lfb1,b in the second period
under bad economic conditions.
If the risk level ∆ is higher, first-best lending throughout all periods will be infeasible
as (6) becomes binding. In response, the banker supplies loans in the first period
beyond their first-best level. Doing so generates additional internal funds at t = 1 and
thus eases the restriction on loan supply at t = 1 in the bad state. As a result, loan
supply becomes volatile. The optimal loan volume lS0 balances the marginal cost of
the efficiency loss in the first period with the marginal benefit of the efficiency gain in
the second period (strategy B).
The higher the risk ∆, the more expensive it is to operate in the safe mode as the
creation of internal funds for the bad state at t = 1 by means of first-period lending
gets more and more difficult. As a consequence, the banker adopts the risky mode at
some risk level. In contrast to the safe mode, the risky mode allows for first-best loan
supply at t = 1 by being associated with a higher funding liquidity of second-period
loans. Although there is no need for supplying inefficiently large loan volumes at t = 0,
the risky mode is by definition costly. A bank run, which occurs in the second period
when conditions turn out to be bad twice in a row, destroys valuable loan earnings,
making first-period lending less attractive. As a consequence, strategy C is associated
with a loan volume lR0 at t = 0 below the first-best, for it balances marginal costs with
lower marginal returns. Since an increase in ∆ reduces the amount of earnings lost
after a bank run, the expected return of first-period loans as well as lR0 increases in ∆
once the risky mode is adopted.
For even higher risk levels, lending lR0 in the first period would result in a substantial
debt overhang under bad economic conditions at t = 1, that exceeds prospective earn-
ings of second-period loans. Anticipating that the bank would respond by defaulting
on its debt, depositors are not willing to refinance that much loans at t = 0. Accord-
ingly, strategy D is to signal credibility to depositors by granting a smaller volume of
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loans lmax0 at t = 0, which is associated with a debt overhang equal to the expected
net return of second-period loans.
Finally, strategy E is to opt for an outright failure at t = 1 when the bad state
materializes at this date. With this strategy, delayed returns on first-period loans
can never be collected, which reduces the optimal volume of loans even further to
lF0 < l
R
0 .
12
2.3. A Discussion of the Environment
Before we study the regulatory implications of our model, a few remarks are due. To
begin with, bank runs are caused by weak fundamentals in equilibrium, not by some
misconduct of the banker. The latter does not happen because the banker will always
behave well in equilibrium. Therefore, bank runs occur with a probability equal to the
probability of loan earnings being low, provided the bank operates in the risky mode.
Otherwise, there is no bank run.
Panic-driven bank runs cannot occur in our framework. Such runs are character-
ized by investors withdrawing only because they believe that other investors without
immediate liquidity needs will withdraw, or that new investors will refuse to provide
funds to an otherwise sound bank. In our model all investors always withdraw after
one period, and unlike in Qi (1994), the behavior of investors, who are to replace the
initial investors at the middle date, does not depend on their expectations about future
investors as there will be none. Hence, an argument similar to Green and Lin (2003)
can be made by applying the backward induction principle. In the second period, all
investors have an incentive to invest in the bank as long as they expect the banker to
pay them back. Therefore, no initial investor has an incentive to pull out at the end of
the first period and enforce the liquidation of the bank provided the bank’s assets are
sufficiently valuable. Note, only because panic-driven bank runs do not occur in our
model does not mean that they do not exist in different setups. However, the condi-
tions under which such runs can occur as an equilibrium outcome are rather specific
(see, e.g., Ennis and Keister, 2010; Andolfatto, Nosal, and Sultanum, 2017).
For the sake of consistency, we thus abstract from deposit insurance as such investor
protection schemes have a role to play primarily in situations in which panic-driven
bank runs are possible.13 However, even with a protection scheme for retail deposits in
place, in practice there are still unprotected institutional investors who can push banks
into default by refusing to roll-over short-term funding, and insured retail investors
may still join the bank run as shown by the Northern Rock example in autumn 2007
(Spiegel, 2011). Finally, we want to understand whether and how regulatory instru-
ments can set incentives ex ante such that situations are avoided in which especially
systemically important banks rely ex post on investor protection schemes or other
taxpayer funded bailouts. Therefore, if one can identify a regulatory measure that is
able to achieve the stability of banks, particularly systemically important ones, there
would be no need for additional investor protection.
The bank in our model does not interact with other banks via asset markets. How-
ever, the presence of interbank asset markets does not change the general decision
problem of banks we consider here. Regardless whether fundamentals are risky or
whether there is a possibility of panic-driven bank runs, banks adopt either a safe or
a risky mode of operation, as shown in Allen and Gale (1998) and Cooper and Ross
(1998), respectively. Moreover, provided interbank asset markets are competitive, the
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value of assets is given to each individual bank, which is what we consider in our
partial-equilibrium model of bank loan supply and capital structure.
Although the nature of bank runs is fundamental as in Allen and Gale (1998), our
approach differs from theirs in that bank runs are not efficient because they destroy
the value of bank assets. For the sake of brevity and clarity, and without loss of
generality, we assume that all assets, including the safe asset, will lose their entire
value to investors (up to some negligible positive amount). A standard justification
for this approach is bankruptcy cost eating away the assets of a bank in bankruptcy.
Another is to consider bank failures as systemic events. Moving away from our partial-
equilibrium approach, in a systemic crisis there is a system-wide dry-up of market
liquidity which is known to make bank assets, even safe ones, temporarily worth less
(see, e.g., Gertler and Kiyotaki, 2015). Even if bank assets would lose not all of their
value, the mechanism we describe is still operative as long as the losses from bank
failure are ex-post large enough to potentially cause a funding constraint ex-ante for
the bank. The banker still has only two ways to respond to this constraint. He either
lowers loan supply or implements a fragile capital structure.
As for the underlying fundamental risk to loan earnings, we do not make any as-
sumptions regarding the relationship of the net present value of loans granted in the
first and second period. First-period loans can be more or less profitable than second-
period loans. We only assume that returns allow for a potential restriction on granting
loans in each period while switching off less interesting cases in which loans are sim-
ply not valuable enough to be granted even if the bank would not face any funding
constraint.
Regulation aims to ensure that banks behave prudently, in particular in times when
economic conditions turn out to be bad. We thus focus on loans whose earnings do
not impose binding constraints on capital structure or loan volume once the economic
conditions at the beginning of the second period turn out to be good, irrespective of
regulation. Assuming that in good times first-period loans have a high and immediate
return at the end of the period and second-period loans entail no credit risk is one way
to ensure this (see top branch in Figure 1). However, the assumptions that second-
period loans in good times are risk-free and that earnings of first-period loans in bad
times are delayed are not crucial for the underlying mechanism and the qualitative
results of our model, as Bucher, Dietrich, and Hauck (2013) show. Delayed earnings
allow a first-best loan supply with a risky capital structure. This enables us to bet-
ter compare the effects of different regulatory instruments. To ensure that there are
no binding constraints if conditions at the beginning of the second period are good,
considering loans in economic good times after one period to be risky would require
additional assumptions, especially regarding loan earnings and the share a banker can
withhold.
Finally, we assume credit risk to be exogenous. However, we expect that our results
would only be reinforced if one would allow for endogenous credit risk. Consider for
example an additional agency problem as in Holmström and Tirole (1997), where more
internal funds strengthen the incentives for the banker to put in more effort and to
lower the probability of low loan earnings. This is because the banker can retain a
larger share in loan earnings in case they are successful without compromising the
investors’ participation constraint. As a result, the stability of the bank increases
and the willingness of external financiers to provide funds improves. These effects are
qualitatively similar in our model. Considering credit risk as exogenous thus primarily
reduces additional clutter.
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3. Regulatory Instruments
As shown, a rational, forward-looking banker may take a chance and risk a bank run if
credit risks are large. Bank runs are not only costly to those who are directly involved.
They also create negative externalities, e.g. by triggering socially costly instabilities
in the financial sector. Therefore, prevention of bank runs is often considered a major
objective of bank regulation. Ideally, regulation would achieve this without affecting
loan supply. In this section, we derive and compare the implications of four regulatory
instruments for bank stability and loan supply. These instruments are risk-weighted
capital-to-asset ratios, counter-cyclical capital buffers, liquidity coverage ratios and
regulatory margin calls. We assume that these instruments cannot be made contingent
on the bank-specific risk ∆ but only on the economic state in which a bank finds itself
at the beginning of the second period.
3.1. Risk-weighted Capital-to-Asset Ratio
In this section we analyze how banks change their lending behavior and capital struc-
ture choice in response to a risk-weighted capital-to-asset ratio, henceforth CAR. To
incorporate this instrument in our model economy, we make three assumptions. First,
there is a uniform, positive risk weight applied to all loans unless the regulator knows
for sure that no loans on a bank’s book are risky. In this case loans are treated as a risk-
free asset and bear a risk weight of zero. Second, regulatory capital is not restricted
to the amount of funds provided by shareholders but may also include the bank’s
internal funds, as we shall further explain. Third, we restrict attention to CAR that
make the risky and failure mode less attractive to bankers without putting safe banks
under undue strain. In this regard, we build on two implications from our benchmark
scenario. One is that the bank’s effective capital-to-asset ratio increases in credit risk.
The other implication is that for a given credit risk the bank’s effective capital-to-asset
ratio is larger in the safe mode than in the risky or failure mode.
It follows that, when economic conditions at t = 1 are good, the banker faces good
economic conditions for the following period as well. He holds only risk-free loans on
the bank’s books in the second period, for which a risk weight of zero applies. When
economic conditions at t = 1 are bad, first-period loans have not generated any income
for the bank. The bank will hold legacy loans as well as new loans on its books in the
second period. CAR then applies a uniform risk weight to all loans and requires that
regulatory capital covers at least a fraction κ of these loans. The value of regulatory
capital is given by the book value of bank’s assets, l0 + l1,b + a1,b, net of the face value
of deposits, δ1,b. Hence, regulatory capital is the larger the more funds are available to
finance a bank’s assets from any sources other than deposits, which includes external
equity as well as internal funds.
When conditions are bad at t = 1, CAR implies a constraint on deposits according
to
δ1,b ≤ (1− κ)(l0 + l1,b) + a1,b. (10)
The regulation makes the risky mode less attractive when it puts an effective upper
bound on new deposits for a bank operating in the risky mode. When economic con-
ditions are bad at t = 1, a necessary condition for this is (1 − κ)(l0 + l1,b) + a1,b <
vbl0 +rbl1,b+a1,b. There are two important effects to consider for such a bank. First, a
higher CAR will lower the funding liquidity of second-period loans. For a sufficiently
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tight regulation, i.e. for κ > 1− 1−(1−λ)p2rbλp2 , there will be even a funding gap. Second,
a higher CAR will reduce the internal funds available to the bank, for the funding
liquidity of legacy loans is decreasing in CAR. As long as outstanding deposits are
still covered by the funding liquidity, i.e. there are some internal funds, the banker
could close any funding gap by granting more loans in the first period. However, as
both, a higher loan supply at t = 0 and a lower loan supply in the bad state at t = 1
will dampen expected profits for the risky mode, a banker has a stronger incentive to
operate in the safe mode.
In the first period, the value of capital is again determined by the book value of
the bank’s assets, l0 + a0, net of the face value of deposits, δ0. CAR requires that
regulatory capital covers at least a fraction κ of loans, hence imposing once more a
constraint on the face value of deposits
δ0 ≤ (1− κ)l0 + a0. (11)
Similar to above, CAR makes the failure mode less attractive at t = 0 when the
constraint on deposits is binding for a bank choosing a risky capital structure already
in the first period, i.e. if (1 − κ)l0 + a0 < vgl0 + a0. The banker can grant loans in
the first period if their funding liquidity is positive. This is the case when CAR is
not too tight and risk is not too small. The latter follows because the return on first-
period loans in good economic conditions, which determines what the banker can pay
shareholders at most, increases in risk.
Finally, we need to establish the conditions under which CAR does not impose
any additional burden on a bank operating in a safe mode. One refers to the funding
liquidity of second-period loans when the bank operates in the safe mode. A safe bank
will not be affected by the regulation, if the funding liquidity is not impaired by CAR,
i.e. if κ < 1 − 1−(1−λ)p2rbλ . Another condition refers to the funding liquidity of first-
period loans, i.e. on the advantages of building up internal funds. We know from the
benchmark that an unregulated bank, which faces a funding constraint and still wants
to operate in the safe mode, will opt for the maximum capital-to-asset ratio that just
allows staying in operation. Hence we restrict attention to κ < 1 − 1−(1−λ)p1µ11−(1−λ)p1 , for
any higher CAR will result in a negative funding liquidity and render the safe mode
impossible.
The implications of CAR for bank stability and loan supply are summarized in the
following proposition.
Proposition 2. Let K :=
[
1− 1−(1−λ)p2rbλp2 , min
{
1− 1−(1−λ)p2rbλ , 1−
1−(1−λ)p1µ1
1−(1−λ)p1
}]
. If
{κ : κ ∈ K} 6= ∅, the banker’s optimal response to CAR for all κ ∈ K is characterized
by
A : m∗ = S, l∗0 = l
fb
0 , l
∗
1,b = l
fb
1,b if ∆ ≤ ∆
A,
BCAR : m∗ = S, l∗0 = lS0 > l
fb
0 , l
∗
1,b = ψl
S
0 < l
fb
1,b if ∆ ∈
(
∆A, ∆Bκ
]
,
CCAR : m∗ = R, l∗0 = lR0,κ ≥ lR0 , l∗1,b = min{l
fb
1,b, l
max
1,κ } if ∆ ∈
(
∆Bκ , ∆
C
κ
]
,
DCAR : m∗ = R, l∗0 = lmax0,κ , l∗1,b = min{l
fb
1,b, l
max
1,κ } if ∆ ∈
(
∆Cκ, min{∆Dκ , ∆
ψ
κ }
]
,
XCAR : m∗ = S, l∗0 = 0 < l
fb
0 , l
∗
1,b = 0 < l
fb
1,b if ∆ ∈
(
∆ψκ , ∆
E
κ
]
,
ECAR : m∗ = F , l∗0 = lF0 < l
fb
0 , l
∗
1,b = 0 < l
fb
1,b if ∆ > max{∆
D
κ , ∆
E
κ},
with all critical values being defined in the appendix.
Proof. See appendix.
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The proposition looks at those regulatory capital-to-asset ratios that make the risky
and failure mode less attractive while imposing no additional burdens on banks op-
erating in the safe mode. We gain three important insights. The first refers to a new
trade-off between bank stability and volatility in loan supply. As expected profits as-
sociated with the risky mode are reduced, bankers facing credit risks larger than ∆B
but less than some ∆Bκ will respond to the introduction of CAR by operating their
bank in the safe mode. Hence, instead of supplying too few loans in the first period
(as they would without CAR), these banks supply more loans at t = 0 than justified
by their NPV, followed by a credit crunch in t = 2 if conditions turn out to be bad
(strategy BCAR). This is because they now do what banks facing lower risks also do:
tackle possible future funding problems by boosting internal funds via increased loan
supply at t = 0 in case it later becomes difficult to raise funds externally.
Second, CAR also amplifies volatility in loan supply without improving bank stabil-
ity. As argued above, CAR implies a funding constraint in the risky mode. Even if this
constraint prevents banks from granting the efficient loan volume under bad conditions
at t = 1, they may still not switch to the safe mode because switching would lead to an
even tighter funding constraint. Instead, some banks will grant additional loans in the
first period (strategy CCAR). This is for two reasons. First, granting more first-period
loans helps build up more internal funds for t = 1. This is similar to safe banks facing
a restriction at t = 1. The second reason applies only to regulated risky banks. For
them, granting more loans in the first period also increases the book value of total
bank assets at t = 1, allowing a bank to use more deposits to borrow against newly
granted loans at this date under bad conditions. Due to this second effect, granting
additional loans at t = 0 may even be beneficial if these loans result in a debt overhang
at t = 1. However, if the debt overhang becomes too pronounced, the bank will observe
an upper bound on first-period loans ensuring that it stays in business in the second
period (DCAR). In any case, such banks operate in a risky manner without and with
regulation. CAR only increases volatility of their loan supply.
Third, the effects of CAR on bank stability are ambiguous for rather large credit
risks. Either CAR induces a bank to implement a fragile capital structure already at
the beginning (failure mode), implying that credit intermediation is stopped by a bank
run when conditions become bad at t = 1 (strategy ECAR). Or a bank will grant no
loans at all in the first period. Doing so will allow a banker to stay in business and
grant loans in the second period should the economy turn out to be in good economic
conditions at t = 1 (strategy XCAR). For this bank, the introduction of CAR achieves
bank stability but at a very high cost in terms of credit disintermediation.
3.2. Liquidity Coverage Ratio
With Basel III, a further innovation has been made to the regulatory framework for
banks. Traditionally, capital regulation requires banks to cover risky assets with capi-
tal. The new liquidity coverage ratio, henceforth LCR, establishes another link between
balance sheet items. It requires banks to cover their expected net cash outflows over
some time period by a certain amount of high quality liquid assets.
In the context of our model, net cash outflows in each period are given by the total
face value of deposits payable at the end of that period. Our risk-free asset is the high
quality liquid asset the regulation refers to. LCR is then defined by η := atδt . Note that
in our modeling approach we consider the total face value of deposits, for there will
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be no partial withdrawal of deposits. Hence, in the model LCR can be smaller than
100% to guarantee bank stability.14
Just like CAR, LCR implies an upper bound on deposits. Unlike CAR, LCR does
never affect loans for banks in the safe mode, no matter how tight the regulation is.
The reason is that for them the risk-free asset yields exactly the return required by
depositors. Hence, a banker can simply inflate the bank’s balance sheet by issuing
deposits to be invested in the risk-free asset until the bank meets the requirement.
Doing so has no impact on loans so that a banker’s decision on building up internal
funds is left unchanged.
Only loan supply by banks in the risky or failure mode is potentially affected by
LCR. The regulation puts an upper bound on the face value of deposits. This upper
bound is given by
δ1,b ≤
a1,b
η
, (12)
if economic conditions are bad at the end of the first period, and
δ0 ≤
a0
η
, (13)
at the beginning of the first period. When the banker opts for the risky or failure mode,
the probability of a bank run and thus of a loss in asset values is strictly positive, for
which the expected net return on the risk-free asset is negative in the respective period.
In our benchmark this is exactly the reason why a bank operating in the risky or failure
mode would not want to invest in risk-free assets.
The mechanism through which LCR changes incentives for the banker builds on this
effect. In principle, without LCR a bank operating in the risky or failure mode would
not be restricted in refinancing loans with deposits. In the risky mode, this holds true
for both, new and legacy loans if economic conditions are bad at t = 1. To comply
with LCR, the bank has to hold a certain fraction of total deposits in loss-bearing safe
assets. Accordingly, granting loans in the second period is restricted and the benefits of
granting loans in the first period for the sake of making provisions for possible future
financial difficulties are smaller with LCR. In order to increase internal funds in bad
times, the banker thus has to grant more loans than without LCR. That way, LCR is
like a tax on a bank which is not operating in the safe mode, reducing the expected
profits made in the risky and failure mode. Therefore, LCR makes both of these modes
less attractive to the banker.
Two further observations are in order. First, when η is sufficiently large, raising de-
posits to co-finance the bank’s loan portfolio does not pay at all. The losses which ac-
crue from holding so many risk-free assets will more than outweigh the gains associated
with improvements in the loans’ funding liquidity due to replacing equity shares by de-
posits. This will be the case either at t = 0 or t = 1 if η ≥ min
{
λp1
1−(1−λ)p1 ,
λp2
1−(1−λ)p2
}
.
Second, when economic conditions turn out to be bad at the end of the first period,
LCR not only imposes a burden on deposits to refinance new loans but also on deposits
raised against nonperforming loans. Accordingly, LCR implies a loss in internal funds
if the banker opts for the risky mode.
This leads us to the following conclusion.
15
Proposition 3. Let η < min
{
λp1
1−(1−λ)p1 ,
λp2
1−(1−λ)p2
}
. The banker’s optimal response
to LCR is then characterized by
A : m∗ = S, l∗0 = l
fb
0 , l
∗
1,b = l
fb
1,b if ∆ ≤ ∆
A,
BLCR : m∗ = S, l∗0 = lS0 > l
fb
0 , l
∗
1,b = ψl
S
0 < l
fb
1,b if ∆ ∈
(
∆A, ∆Bη
]
,
CLCR : m∗ = R, l∗0 = lR0,η , l∗1,b = min{l
fb
1,b, l
max
1,η } if ∆ ∈
(
∆Bη , ∆
C
η
]
,
DLCR : m∗ = R, l∗0 = lmax0,ηR , l
∗
1,b = min{l
fb
1,b, l
max
1,η } if ∆ ∈
(
∆Cη , ∆
D
η
]
,
ELCR : m∗ = F , l∗0 = min{lF0 , lmax0,ηF } < l
fb
0 , l
∗
1,b = 0 < l
fb
1,b if ∆ > ∆
D
η ,
with all critical values being defined in the appendix.
Proof. See appendix.
LCR does not affect banks exposed to small risks. They will be safe and supply loans
according to the first-best (strategy A). Banks with somewhat larger risk exposure
will stay safe and their loan supply exhibits volatility, just like in the benchmark case.
However, as LCR makes the risky mode less attractive, the risk threshold above which
a banker opts for the risky mode will increase. In response to LCR, additional banks —
those with ∆ ∈ (∆B, ∆Bη ] — will thus switch to the safe mode and their loan supply
will become volatile.
For a banker who keeps his bank in the risky mode, LCR reduces the expected
profits of granting loans in the second period when economic conditions are bad. Due
to the restriction on deposits, loan supply may not exceed some upper bound imposed
by LCR. In anticipation of this, the banker is incentivized to increase loan supply in
the first period to build up more internal funds easing the restriction on granting loans
in the second period (strategy CLCR). However, such a behavior might be restricted by
an upper bound on first-period loans as the funding liquidity of first-period loans has
to cover outstanding deposits at t = 1 (strategy DLCR). In both cases, the increased
volatility results in smaller expected profits for banks.
To conclude, LCR can also increase volatility in loan supply for banks operating in
the risky mode. In order to reduce effects like this, Perotti and Suarez (2011) have
suggested to implement liquidity requirements that are larger in good times and lower
in bad times. The lesson from our model, however, is that larger liquidity requirements
in good times will only result in an artificial demand for risk-free assets. Lowering
liquidity requirements in an economic downturn will reduce volatility in loan supply
but will likewise harm bank stability for some ranges of risk levels.
Note that for η > max
{
λp1
1−(1−λ)p1 ,
λp2
1−(1−λ)p2
}
, both the risky and failure mode are
not available. The banker picks from strategy A or B as defined in the benchmark if
∆ ≤ ∆ψ. Otherwise he grants loans only once economic conditions at t = 1 turned
out to be good. The reason is that liquidity requirements can hamper banks to a point
where granting loans becomes unprofitable.15
3.3. Regulatory Margin Calls
In the last step, we examine the regulatory margin call, henceforth RMC (Hart and
Zingales, 2011). RMC stands out from other regulatory instruments. For one, it ex-
plicitly combines a measure that aims at preventing financial institutions from getting
into financial difficulties with a mechanism of how to manage an institution once it
is in distress. Moreover, RMC also constitutes an attempt to reduce the complexity
of bank regulation by introducing a simple rule based on market information. As the
CDS market is supposedly the leading market with respect to information discovery,
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the CDS spread on a financial institution is considered to be a reliable indicator for
its probability of default.16
In the model we operationalize RMC as follows. We assume that a CDS is always
fairly priced. When a bank operates in the risky or failure mode, its probability of
default is positive, and market participants demand additional CDS contracts. With
an increased demand, the CDS spread of this bank is above the threshold of zero basis
points. Without any delay, the banker has to raise additional equity to bring down
the probability of default. Otherwise the bank will be taken over by the supervisory
authority, replacing the bank’s management and wiping out its shareholders.17 Hence,
only for a bank operating in the safe mode the CDS spread does not rise above the
threshold.
Unlike the other regulatory instruments discussed above, RMC is the only one that
does not depend on the economic conditions a bank faces. When a banker operates
in the safe mode, RMC imposes no additional constraint, regardless how economic
conditions are. Operating in the risky or failure mode, however, will always trigger the
margin call. It is also important to note that RMC does not change the marginal cost
or benefits of accumulating internal funds. The main incentive effect of RMC comes
from leaving a banker with an expected loss if he opted for the risky or failure mode,
for he has to bear the costs of granting and managing loans without receiving any
compensation for his effort.
Considering these effects for both periods, we obtain
Proposition 4. The banker’s optimal response to RMC is characterized by
A : m∗ = S, l∗0 = l
fb
0 , l
∗
1,b = l
fb
1,b if ∆ ≤ ∆
A,
BRMC : m∗ = S, l∗0 = lS0 > l
fb
0 , l
∗
1,b = ψl
S
0 < l
fb
1,b if ∆ ∈
(
∆A, ∆ψ
]
,
XRMC : m∗ = S, l∗0 = 0 < l
fb
0 , l
∗
1,b = 0 < l
fb
1,b if ∆ > ∆
ψ,
with all critical values being defined in the appendix.
Proof. See appendix.
Because of its simple structure, the effects of RMC are quite straight forward. A
banker will never operate in the risky or failure mode. As the safe mode is not affected,
his preference for the unrestricted safe mode is unchanged for all credit risks ∆ below
∆A (strategy A). For higher risks up to ∆ψ, loan supply in the safe mode is restricted
and feasible (strategy BRMC). Granting any loans in a safe mode is not feasible,
however, for risks above ∆ψ. In order to avoid any losses from putting the bank at
risk with the risky or failure mode, a banker prefers to grant no loans at all both in
the first period and later when economic conditions turn out to be bad. Instead, he
holds risk-free assets only and will possibly start lending again should conditions turn
out to be good at the end of the first period (strategy XRMC).
4. Concluding Remarks
This paper emphasizes a link between a bank’s present and future capital structure
choice and loan supply. Capital structure and lending today jointly determine how
much funds can be freed up tomorrow. The ability to resort to those internal funds
can be pivotal when a bank faces the risk of getting into liquidity problems at some
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future date, i.e. difficulties in raising fresh funds externally to refinance new loans with
positive NPV. In our model such liquidity problems arise because of frictions that make
deposits, external equity and internal funds only imperfect substitutes. Equity suffers
from an agency problem at the bank management level, but provides a buffer in case
of liquidity problems; deposits help overcoming the agency problem, but may impose a
threat to the bank’s stability; internal funds are neither subject to the agency problem
nor do they threaten stability, but they are available only up to a limited amount, for
they are the outcome of costly actions taken by the bank management under imperfect
information in the past.
Against this background, our paper has identified a novel channel through which
regulation affects the behavior of banks. We have shown that regulation effectively
changes the costs and benefits of generating internal funds. Regulatory instruments
differ in how they influence these costs and benefits. In principle, CAR, LCR as well as
RMC impose a restriction on deposits and thereby on bank loan supply when banks
operate in the risky mode. If this restriction becomes binding, banks have stronger
incentives to operate in the safe mode. This is because gambling for resurrection once
conditions turn out to be bad becomes less attractive relative to building up internal
funds prior to potential financial problems.
Differences between instruments exist particularly with respect to banks which still
operate in the risky mode even with regulation. For those banks, CAR and a low LCR
still provide incentives to build up internal funds. The reason is that these instruments
make the funding constraint for banks operating in the risky mode even tighter should
economic conditions turn out to be bad. To ease their funding constraint, banks thus
seek to build up internal funds by granting more loans in the first period. RMC and
a high LCR do not have such an effect on loan supply.
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Notes
1 Demandable debt gives investors an option to force liquidation. This can prevent moral hazard by de-
terring a banker from making socially wasteful investment decisions (Calomiris and Kahn, 1991) or contract-
enforcement problems by eliminating a banker’s incentive to renegotiate payments to investors once investments
have been made (Diamond and Rajan, 2001). Bankruptcy for liquidity providing banks is often associated with
bank runs (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983; Diamond and Rajan, 2001; Allen and Gale, 2004). Such bank runs can
be very costly for society (Dell’Ariccia, Detragiache, and Rajan, 2008).
2Typically, it is not crucial why equity makes liquidity provision more costly from an individual bank’s
perspective. In Diamond and Rajan (2000) it is because banks can exploit informational rents from shareholders
but not depositors. Hart and Zingales (2011) cite tax advantages, government guarantees and agency costs as
three possible reasons for why debt in general, and deposits in particular, can be cheaper than equity. Allen,
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Carletti, and Marquez (2015) argue that equity can be costly in the presence of bankruptcy costs when deposit
and equity markets are segmented. For a critical view on the implications for the social cost of equity see
Admati et al. (2014).
3That way, we give an alternative to the financial instability hypothesis (Minsky, 1986, 1994; Kindleberger,
1978) as an explanation for credit booms that later bust (as documented by Schularick and Taylor, 2012, and
Jordi, Schularick, and Taylor, 2013).
4Others have attributed such effects of bank capital regulation to variations in risk-weights over the business
cycle, see Repullo and Suarez (2013), Ferri, Liu, and Majnoni (2001) and Mulder and Montfort (2000). See
Allen and Saunders (2004) for a survey on pro-cyclicality.
5See Arnold et al. (2012) for a survey of the role of systemic risk for macro-prudential bank regulation.
6Unless otherwise indicated all returns are per unit.
7The returns thus exhibit persistent and mean reverting shocks, which is a common assumption in macro-
models, cf. Aghion et al. (2010).
8For a given probability p1, there is a linear relationship between our risk measure ∆ and the standard
deviations ∆
√
p1(1− p1).
9From a regulatory perspective, an explicit analysis of a risky loan supply following an initial good return
is obsolete as it does not create a failure issue, see e.g. Bucher, Dietrich, and Hauck (2013).
10Restricting attention to p1, p2 ≥ 0.6 reduces complexity, as it ensures that for sufficiently large credit risk
the banker always puts the bank at risk already in the first period.
11Considering internal funds as the only form of equity does not change our benchmark results qualitatively,
see Bucher, Dietrich, and Hauck (2013). In this setup, we however want to leave the decision on the type of
equity with the banker, as we regard a more general decision to be useful for evaluating capital requirements.
12Independent of the optimal strategy, our findings are thus in line with the pecking order theory, as the
banker prefers internal funds over deposits over external equity.
13Optimal deposit insurance is, at any rate, necessarily only partial (Wallace, 1988).
14Basel III is based on the notion that not all depositors will withdraw their funds within that time period
so that the actual LCR which is set to be at least 100% is not comparable in size with the LCR determined in
our model.
15A similar argument has been made by De Nicolò, Gamba, and Lucchetta (2014).
16As market participants write CDS contracts on both banks and LFIs, this regulatory measure can be
applied not only to banks, but to all financial institutions on which CDS contracts exist.
17Note that any market participant inside or outside the bank may enter into a CDS contract on the bank.
We do not need to consider debt explicitly for our analysis, for an underlying is not a requisite for market
participants to agree on a CDS contract.
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Appendix
A. Proof of Proposition 1
This proof proceeds in three steps. Applying backward induction, we start by deter-
mining the banker’s optimal behavior in the second period. First, we consider the bad
state at t = 1 in section A.1 that includes Lemma 5. Second, we consider the good
state at t = 1 in section A.2 and Lemma 6. Finally, we determine the banker’s optimal
behavior at t = 0 in section A.3.
To simplify notation, it is useful to define
φ0 (l0) = (µ− 1) l0 − c (l0) , (14)
φ1,g (l1,g) = (rg − 1) l1,g − c (l1,g) , (15)
φ1,b (l1,b) = (p2rb − 1) l1,b − c (l1,b) . (16)
A.1. Second Period (t = 1), Bad State
In analogy to the modes m ∈ {S,R,F} identified in the paper, we use the modes
m1,b = {s, r, f} that the banker can implement from t = 1 in the bad state onwards.
A.1.1. Optimization Problem
Unless the banker chooses m1,b = f , his optimization problem reads
max
l1,b,a1,b,δ1,b∈R+
π1,b = λE [max {vbl0 + rjl1,b + a1,b − δ1,b, 0}]− c (l1,b) (17)
s. t. l1,b + a1,b = ω1,bl0 + d1,b + e1,b, (18)
d1,b =
{
δ1,b if m1,b = s : δ1,b ≤ vbl0 + a1,b,
p2δ1,b if m1,b = r : δ1,b ∈ (vbl0 + a1,b, vbl0 + rbl1,b + a1,b] ,
(19)
e1,b = (1− λ)E [max {vbl0 + rjl1,b + a1,b − δ1,b, 0}] , (20)
with j = {h, l}, rh = rb, rl = 0 and ω1,b := − δ0−a0l0 . We will show below that ω1,b < 0,
see (40).
Equation (17) reflects the banker’s expected profit in the bad state. Equation (18)
gives the bank’s budget constraint. The decision of depositors and shareholders to
provide funds depends on the mode of operation and their respective expected payoff
(see equation 19 and 20).
A.1.2. Determination of Reduced Forms and Optimal Loan Volumes
A.1.2.1. Safe Mode. Suppose the banker chooses m1,b = s. Inserting (19) and
(20) in (18), solving for δ1,b, and inserting the result in (17) and the restriction on δ1,b
in (19) yields
max
l1,b,a1,b∈R+
πs1,b = (vb + ω1,b) l0 + φ1,b (l1,b) (21)
s. t. [1− (1− λ)p2rb]l1,b ≤ (vb + ω1,b)l0. (22)
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It follows from (21) that
∂πs1,b
∂l1,b
= φ′1,b (l1,b), which is decreasing in l1,b and equal to
zero for l1,b = l
fb
1,b. The optimal loan volume l
s∗
1,b and the expected profit π
s∗
1,b thus read
ls∗1,b = min{lfb1,b, lmax1 } and πs∗1,b = (vb + ω1,b) l0 + φ1,b
(
min{lfb1,b, lmax1 }
)
, (23)
where lmax1 is defined by
lmax1 :=
vb + ω1,b
1− (1− λ)p2rb
l0. (24)
A.1.2.2. Risky Mode. Suppose the banker chooses m1,b = r so that the reduced
form is given by
max
l1,b,a1,b∈R+
πr1,b = (p2vb + ω1,b) l0 + φ1,b (l1,b)− (1− p2)a1,b (25)
s. t. [p2rb − 1]l1,b ≥ −p2vbl0 − ω1,bl0 + (1− p2)a1,b. (26)
It follows from (25) that
∂πr1,b
∂l1,b
= φ′1,b (l1,b), which is decreasing in l1,b and is equal to
zero for l1,b = l
fb
1,b. The optimal loan volume l
r∗
1,b and the expected profit π
r∗
1,b thus read
lr∗1,b = l
fb
1,b and π
r∗
1,b = (p2vb + ω1,b) l0 + φ1,b
(
lfb1,b
)
. (27)
A.1.2.3. Failure Mode. Suppose the banker chooses m1,b = f by closing the bank
in the bad state at t = 1. By definition, the optimal loan volume lf∗1,b and the expected
profit πf∗1,b are given by
lf∗1,b = 0 and π
f∗
1,b = 0. (28)
A.1.3. Comparison
Comparing expected profits, we obtain
Lemma 5. If the economy is in the bad state at date t = 1, the banker’s optimal
decision on the mode of operation, m∗1,b, bank loan supply, l
∗
1,b, and his expected profit
π∗1,b will have the following properties:
• Given vb + ω1,b ≥ 0, then
m∗1,b = s, l
∗
1,b = l
fb
1,b, π
∗
1,b = π
s∗
1,b if l0 ≥
1−(1−λ)p2rb
vb+ω1,b
lfb1,b,
m∗1,b = s, l
∗
1,b = l
max
1 , π
∗
1,b = π
s∗
1,b if l0 ∈ [lmin0 ,
1−(1−λ)p2rb
vb+ω1,b
lfb1,b),
m∗1,b = r, l
∗
1,b = l
fb
1,b, π
∗
1,b = π
r∗
1,b if l0 < l
min
0 ,
(29)
• Given vb + ω1,b < 0, then
m∗1,b = r, l
∗
1,b = l
fb
1,b, π
∗
1,b = π
r∗
1,b if l0 ≤ lmax0 ,
m∗1,b = f , l
∗
1,b = 0, π
∗
1,b = π
f∗
1,b if l0 > l
max
0 ,
(30)
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where πs∗1,b, π
r∗
1,b and π
f∗
1,b are defined by (23), (27) and (28), respectively,
lmax0 := −
φ1,b(lfb1,b)
p2vb+ω1,b
, (31)
lmax1 :=
vb+ω1,b
1−(1−λ)p2rb l0, (32)
and where lmin0 is implicitly defined by
(1− p2)vbl0 + φ1,b (lmax1 (l0)) = φ1,b(l
fb
1,b). (33)
A.2. Second Period (t = 1), Good State
The banker’s behavior in the good state can be determined analogously. As granting
loans is not restricted in the safe mode, we obtain
Lemma 6. If the economy is in the good state at date t = 1, the banker’s optimal
decision on the mode of operation, m∗1,g, bank loan supply, l
∗
1,g, and his expected profit
π∗1,g will have the following properties:
m∗1,g = s, l
∗
1,g = l
fb
1,g, π
∗
1,g = π
s∗
1,g ∀ l0, (34)
where πs∗1,g = λω1,gl0 + φ1,g
(
lfb1,g
)
and ω1,g := vg − δ0−a0l0 .
A.3. First period
A.3.1. Optimization Problem
Unless the banker immediately closes the bank at the beginning of the first period, his
optimization problem at t = 0 reads
max
l0,a0,δ0∈R+
π0 = p1π1,g(l
∗
1,g) + (1− p1)π1,b(l∗1,b)− c(l0) (35)
s. t. l0 + a0 = d0 + e0, (36)
d0 =
{
δ0 if m0 = s : m
∗
1,b 6= f
p1δ0 if m0 = r : m
∗
1,b = f
, (37)
e0 = (1− λ)p1ω1,gl0. (38)
The banker anticipates his optimal behavior in the future when maximizing his ex-
pected profit, π0, at the beginning of the first period, see (35). He considers the bud-
get constraint (36), depositors’ willingness to provide funds (37) and shareholders’
expected payoff (38).
A.3.2. Determination of Reduced Forms and Optimal Loan Volumes
Recall from Lemma 6 that the banker will always operate in the safe mode if economic
conditions are good at t = 1. Therefore, we only have to consider all combinations
feasible based on the modes available in the first period and in the bad state at t = 1.
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A.3.2.1. Safe Mode m = S. Suppose the banker chooses m0 = s and m∗1,b = s,
or in short m = S. Inserting (37) and (38) in (36), solving for δ0 and inserting the
result in the definition of ω1,g and ω1,b yields
ω1,g =
vg − 1
1− (1− λ) p1
> 0, (39)
ω1,b = −
1− (1− λ) p1vg
1− (1− λ) p1
< 0. (40)
Moreover, inserting π∗1,g as defined in Lemma 6 and π
∗
1,b for m
∗
1,b = s as defined in
Lemma 5 as well as ω1,g and ω1,b in (35) and l
max
1 as defined in (32) yields
max
l0,a0∈R+
πS0 (l0) = φ0(l0) + p1φ1,g(l
fb
1,g) + (1− p1)φ1,b(min{lfb1,b, lmax1 (l0)}) (41)
with lmax1 =
µ− 1− λp1∆
[1− (1− λ)p1][1− (1− λ)p2rb]
l0 =: ψl0. (42)
Strategy A: If (42) is not binding, it follows from (41) that ∂π
S
0
∂l0
= φ′0(l0), which
decreases in l0 and is equal to zero for l0 = l
fb
0 . Hence the optimal loan volume is
l∗0 = l
fb
0 with
∂lfb0
∂∆ = 0 due to the mean preserving spread.
Strategy B: If (42) is binding, it follows from (41) that
∂πS0
∂l0
=φ′0(l0) + (1− p1)φ′1,b(lmax1 )
∂lmax1
∂l0
. (43)
Note that the first term decreases in l0 as
∂c
∂l0
increases in l0. The second term decreases
in l0 as
∂c(lmax1 )
∂lmax1
increases in lmax1 , which increases in l0. This latter effect is positive as
long as the safe mode is available, i.e. for all ∂l
max
1
∂l0
= ψ > 0. While the first term is
equal to zero for l0 = l
fb
0 , the second term is equal to zero for l0 =
lfb1,b
ψ , as this implies
lmax1 = l
fb
1,b. Note that the safe mode is only restricted in the bad state at t = 1 for
lfb0 <
lfb1,b
ψ . Consequently, there exists a l
S
0 with l
S
0 ∈
[
lfb0 ,
lfb1,b
ψ
]
for which (43) is equal
to zero so that the optimal loan volume is l∗0 = l
S
0 . Applying the implicit function
theorem on the first order condition of πS0 (l0) with respect to l0 yields that
∂lS0
∂∆ is
positive for smaller risks and negative for larger risks.
A.3.2.2. Risky Mode m = R. Suppose the banker chooses m0 = s and m∗1,b = r,
or in short m = R so that the reduced form reads
max
l0,a0∈R+
πR0 (l0) = φ0(l0)− (1− p1)(1− p2)(µ− p1∆)l0
+ p1φ1,g(l
fb
1,g) + (1− p1)φ1,b(lfb1,b) (44)
s. t. l0 ≤
φ1,b
(
lfb1,b
)
1−(1−λ)p1(µ+(1−p1)∆)
1−(1−λ)p1 − p2(µ− p1∆)
=: lmax0 . (45)
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Strategy C: If (45) is not binding, it follows from (44) that
∂πR0
∂l0
= [1− (1− p1)(1− p2)]µ+ (1− p1)(1− p2)p1∆− 1− c′(l0), (46)
which decreases in l0 and is equal to zero for l0 = l
R
0 . Hence the optimal loan volume is
l∗0 = l
R
0 . Applying the implicit function theorem on the first order condition of π
R
0 (l0)
with respect to l0 yields that
∂lR0
∂∆ > 0 due to c
′′(lR0 ) > 0.
Strategy D: If (45) is binding, the optimal loan volume is l∗0 = lmax0 with
∂lmax0
∂∆ < 0,
as λ ∈ [0.5, 1) and p1, p2 ∈ [0.6, 1).18
A.3.2.3. Failure Mode m = F, Strategy E. Suppose the banker choosesm0 = r
and m∗1,b = f , or in short m = F . Inserting (37) and (38) in (36), solving for δ0 and
inserting the result in the definition of ω1,g yields
ω1,g =
p1vg − 1
p1λ
− (1− p1)a0
l0λ
> 0. (47)
Thus, the reduced form reads
max
l0,a0∈R+
πF0 (l0) = φ0(l0)− (1− p1)(µ− p1∆)l0 − (1− p1)a0 + p1φ1,g(lfb1,g) (48)
s. t. l0 > l
max
0 . (49)
It follows from (48) that ∂π
F
0
∂l0
= φ′0(l0)− (1− p1)(µ− p1∆), which decreases in l0 and
is equal to zero for l0 = l
F
0 . Hence the optimal loan volume is l
∗
0 = l
F
0 . Applying the
implicit function theorem on the first order condition of πF0 (l0) with respect to l0
yields ∂l
F
0
∂∆ > 0.
A.3.3. Critical Values of ∆
In the final step, we determine the optimal behavior of the banker for a given risk, ∆.
(1) We denote ∆A as the largest risk level for which the banker is still able to operate
in the unrestricted safe mode in both periods. As the first best loan volumes lfb0
and lfb1,b are independent of ∆ while ψ decreases in ∆, there exists a ∆
A so that
ψlfb0 = l
fb
1,b, which is given by
∆A :=
[(1− λ)p2rb − 1][1− (1− λ)p1]
λp1
lfb1,b
lfb0
+
µ− 1
λp1
. (50)
As πS0 (l
fb
0 ) ≥ πS0 (l0) > πR0 (l0) > πF0 (l0), it is never optimal for the banker to
switch to another strategy for all ∆ ≤ ∆A.
(2) We denote ∆B as the risk level for which the banker is indifferent between strat-
egy B and strategy C. For ∆ = ∆A it follows that πS0 (lfb0 ) = πS0 (lS0 ) > πR0 (l0) >
πF0 (l0). It follows from (41) that the expected profit from strategy B decreases in
∆, as ∂π
S
0 (l
S
0 )
∂∆ =
∂πS0 (l
S
0 )
∂lS0
∂lS0
∂∆ +
∂πS0 (l
S
0 )
∂lmax1
∂lmax1
∂∆ < 0. Moreover, it follows from (44) that
∂πR0 (l
R
0 )
∂∆ =
∂πR0 (l
R
0 )
∂lR0
∂lR0
∂∆ + (1 − p1)(1 − p2)p1l
R
0 > 0. Accordingly, if there exists a
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unique ∆B
′
> ∆A for which πS0 (l
S
0 ) = π
R
0 (l
R
0 ), then the banker will prefer strat-
egy B over strategies C, D and E as πS0 (lS0 ) ≥ πR0 (lR0 ) > πR0 (lmax0 ) > πF0 (lF0 ) for
all ∆ ≤ ∆B′ , while for all ∆ > ∆B′ , the banker prefers strategy C over strategy
B as πR0 (lR0 ) > πS0 (lS0 ). If such a ∆B
′
does not exist within (∆A, ∆ψ], e.g. as lmax0
becomes binding for a ∆ ≤ ∆ψ, the banker prefers strategy B as long as the safe
mode is available in the bad state at t = 1, i.e. for all ∆ ∈ (∆A, ∆ψ] so that
∆B := min{∆B′ , ∆ψ}. (51)
(3) We denote ∆C as the risk level for which the banker is indifferent between strat-
egy C and strategy D. It follows from the definitions of lmax0 and vb that the
banker is indifferent between the two strategies if lR0 = l
max
0 , or if
∆C :=
φr1,b(l
fb
1,b)[1− (1− λ)p1]
p1[p2 − (1− λ)(1− p1(1− p2))]lR0
+
µ[p2 + (1− λ)p1(1− p2)]− 1
p1[p2 − (1− λ)(1− p1(1− p2))]
.
(52)
As long as lR0 < l
max
0 it follows that π
R
0 (l
R
0 ) > π
R
0 (l
max
0 ) > π
F
0 (l
F
0 ) so that the
banker prefers strategy C over strategies D and E for all ∆ ≤ ∆C . For all ∆ > ∆C
strategy C is not feasible.
(4) We denote ∆D as the risk level for which the banker is indifferent between
strategy D and strategy E . It follows from (44) that ∂π
R
0 (l
max
0 )
∂∆ =
∂πR0 (l
max
0 )
∂lmax0
∂lmax0
∂∆ +
(1 − p1)(1 − p2)p1lmax0 , which is negative for larger risks due to
∂πR0 (l
max
0 )
∂lmax0
> 0
and ∂l
max
0
∂∆ < 0. Moreover, it follows from (48) that
∂πF0 (l
F
0 )
∂∆ =
∂πF0 (l
F
0 )
∂lF0
∂lF0
∂∆ + p1(1−
p1)l
F
0 > 0. Hence, there exists a unique ∆
D > ∆C > ∆B > ∆A for which
πR0 (l
max
0 ) = π
F
0 (l
F
0 ) so that for all ∆ ≤ ∆D, the banker prefers strategy D over
strategy E as πR0 (lmax0 ) > πF0 (lF0 ), while for all ∆ > ∆D, the banker prefers E
over D due to πF0 (lF0 ) > πR0 (lmax0 ).
B. Proof of Proposition 2
This proof proceeds analogously to the proof of Proposition 1. In the following, we
only present deviations from the previous proof.
B.1. Second Period (t = 1), Bad State
B.1.1. Determination of Reduced Forms and Optimal Loan Volumes
B.1.1.1. Safe Mode. The regulator aims at imposing capital requirements, which
will not affect bank loan supply given that the bank is already stable. The capital
requirement imposes a restriction
δ1,b ≤ (1− κ)(l0 + l1,b) + a1,b (53)
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on the face value of deposits. Inserting (19) and (20) in (18), solving for δ1,b, and
inserting the result in (53) yields
[1− (1− λ)p2rb − λ(1− κ)]l1,b ≤ [(1− λ)vb + λ(1− κ) + ω1,b)] l0. (54)
As κ < 1 − 1−(1−λ)p1µ1−(1−λ)p1 , the RHS of (54) is positive. Moreover, restricting the capital
ratio to κ < 1− 1−(1−λ)p2rbλ results in a negative LHS of (54). Hence, (54) never binds
and the relevant restriction for the face value of deposits, when operating in the safe
mode, remains to be δ1,b ≤ vbl0 + a1,b so that the optimal loan volume ls∗1,b and the
expected profit πs∗1,b are given by (27).
B.1.1.2. Risky Mode. The regulator aims to impose a binding restriction on bank
loan supply for the risky mode. The capital requirement imposes a restriction (53) on
the face value of deposits. The reduced form thus reads
max
l1,b,a1,b∈R+
πr1,b = (p2vb + ω1,b) l0 + φ1,b (l1,b)− (1− p2)a1,b (55)
s. t. [1− (1− λ)p2rb − λp2(1− κ)] l1,b ≤ [(1− λ)p2vb + λp2(1− κ) + ω1,b] l0. (56)
If κ > 1− 1−(1−λ)p2rbλp2 , bank loan supply will potentially be restricted. Considering this
restriction (56), we can conclude that the optimal loan volume lr∗1,b and the expected
profit πr∗1,b read
lr∗1,b = min{lfb1,b, lmax1,κ } and πr∗1,b = (p2vb + ω1,b) l0 + φ1,b
(
min{lfb1,b, lmax1,κ }
)
(57)
with
lmax1,κ :=
[(1− λ)p2vb + λp2(1− κ) + ω1,b]
1− (1− λ)p2rb − λp2(1− κ)
l0. (58)
B.1.2. Comparison
Comparing expected profits, leads to a similar result as Lemma 5. The two main
differences are that operating in the risky mode may be restricted by lmax1,κ and that
operating in the safe mode is feasible if the banker grants no loans neither in the first
nor in the second period. This results in slightly different intervals for the respective
modes of operation. Note that K is non-empty as long as µ is sufficiently larger than
rb.
B.2. Second Period (t = 1), Good State
As the regulator is able to identify that the economy is in the good state, the risk
weight for loans are zero so that CAR becomes irrelevant. The banker’s behavior is
thus identical to the benchmark scenario, see Lemma 6.
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B.3. First Period
B.3.1. Determination of Reduced Forms and Optimal Loan Volumes
B.3.1.1. Safe Mode m = S. Capital requirements will impose an additional
restriction on the face value of the deposits if (11) becomes binding. In this case,
inserting this restriction on deposits, as well as (37) and (38) into (36), yields
1− (1− λ)p1vg
1− (1− λ)p1
l0 ≤ (1− κ)l0. (59)
As vg = µ + (1 − p1)∆, this condition holds for all risks if κ < 1 − 1−(1−λ)p1µ1−(1−λ)p1 .
Therefore a CAR k ∈ K imposes no additional restriction on bank loan supply so
that (41), (42) and thus strategy A remain unchanged. Strategy BCAR differs from
strategy B in the sense that its upper bound may be larger. Moreover, strategy XCAR
implies that bank loan supply is so heavily restricted when choosing m = S that no
loans can be granted neither in the first period nor in the bad state at t = 1. By
definition this results in l∗0 = 0.
B.3.1.2. Risky Mode m = R. Considering the results of the second period, the
reduced form changes to
max
l0,a0∈R+
πR0,κ (l0) = φ0(l0)− (1− p1)(1− p2)(µ− p1∆)l0
+ p1φ1,g(l
fb
1,g) + (1− p1)φ1,b(min{lfb1,b, lmax1,κ }) (60)
s. t. l0 ≤
φ1,b
(
min{lfb1,b, lmax1,κ }
)
1−(1−λ)p1(µ+(1−p1)∆)
1−(1−λ)p1 − p2(µ− p1∆)
=: lmax0,κ (61)
with
lmax1,κ := ψκl0 and ψκ :=
(1−λ)(p1+p2[1−(1−λ)p1])µ+(1−λ)p1(1−p1−p2[1−(1−λ)p1])∆−1
1−(1−λ)p1 + λp2(1− κ)
1− (1− λ)p2rb − λp2(1− κ)
.
(62)
Strategy CCAR: If (61) is not binding, it follows from (60) that
∂πR0
∂l0
= φ′0(l0)− (1− p1)(1− p2)(µ− p1∆)
+ (1− p1)φ′1,b(min{lfb1,b, lmax1,κ })
∂min{lfb1,b, lmax1,κ }
∂l0
. (63)
There exists a lR0,κ with l
R
0,κ ∈
[
lR0 ,
lfb1,b
ψκ
]
for which (63) is equal to zero, so that the
optimal loan volume is l∗0 = l
R
0,κ. Applying the implicit function theorem on the first
order condition of πR0,κ (l0) with respect to l0 yields that
∂lR0,κ
∂∆ is positive for smaller
risks and negative for larger risks.
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Strategy DCAR: If (61) is binding, the optimal loan volume is l∗0 = lmax0,κ with
∂lmax0,κ
∂∆ < 0. Strategy DCAR is feasible as long as ψκ ≥ 0. In analogy to ∆
ψ, we define
the risk for which ψκ = 0 as ∆
ψ
κ .
B.3.1.3. Failure Mode m = F, Strategy ECAR. Capital requirements will al-
ways impose a restriction on the face value of deposits as (1 − κ)l0 + a0 < vgl0 + a0
is always fulfilled. Considering this restriction when inserting (37) and (38) into (36),
yields
[1− (1− λ)p1vg − λp1(1− κ)]l0 ≤ 0. (64)
In consequence, this mode will only be feasible at t = 0 if the funding liquidity of
first-period loans, (1−λ)p1vg+λp1(1−κ)−1, is positive. If κ < 1− 1−(1−λ)p1[µ+(1−p1)∆]λp1 ,
a sufficient amount of deposits will be issued so that bank loan supply is feasible and
unrestricted. As this threshold depends on ∆, imposing a certain κ implies that this
mode is feasible for all
∆ ≥ 1− λp1 − (1− λ)p1µ+ λp1κ
(1− λ)p1(1− p1)
=: ∆Eκ. (65)
Strategy ECAR thus also only differs from strategy E with respect to its interval.
B.3.2. Critical Values of ∆
∆Bκ , ∆
C
κ and ∆
D
κ are obtained analogously to ∆
B, ∆C and ∆D, as the indifference
between strategy BCAR and CCAR, strategy CCAR and DCAR, as well as DCAR and
ECAR with
∆Cκ :=
φ1,b(min{lfb1,b, lmax1,κ })[1− (1− λ)p1]
p1[p2 − (1− λ)(1− p1(1− p2))]lR0,κ
+
µ[p2 + (1− λ)p1(1− p2)]− 1
p1[p2 − (1− λ)(1− p1(1− p2))]
. (66)
If ∆Dκ does not exist within (∆
C
κ, ∆
ψ
κ ], e.g. as capital requirements are so strict that
∆ψκ < ∆Eκ, the banker will prefer strategy DCAR as long as the risky mode is available
in the bad state at t = 1, i.e. for all ∆ ∈ (∆Cκ, ∆
ψ
κ ]. In this case, the banker will prefer
strategy XCAR for all ∆ ∈ (∆ψκ , ∆Eκ) and strategy ECAR as soon as this strategy is
feasible, i.e. for all ∆ > ∆Eκ.
C. Proof of Proposition 3
This proof proceeds analogously to the proof of Proposition 1 so that we only show
deviations from the previous proofs.
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C.1. Second Period (t = 1), Bad State
C.1.1. Determination of Reduced Forms and Optimal Loan Volumes
C.1.1.1. Safe Mode. The LCR will result in a restriction on the face value of
deposits if
a1,b
η
≤ vbl0 + a1,b. (67)
Limiting the LCR to η ∈ (0, 1) implies that such a restriction is never binding. In
order to fulfill the LCR, the banker can simply issue more deposits that are invested
in the risk-free asset. This increases the LHS of (67) to a larger extent than the
RHS. Accordingly there exists a critical a1,b for which the LCR imposes no additional
restriction on the face value of deposits so that the optimal loan volume and the
expected profit are given by (23).
C.1.1.2. Risky Mode. The expected profit of the risk-free asset in the risky mode
is p2−1 < 0, see (25). Therefore, the LCR will always impose a restriction on the face
value of deposits, i.e. δ1,b ≤ a1,bη becomes binding. Considering this new restriction on
deposits the reduced form reads
max
l1,b,a1,b∈R+
πr1,b = (p2vb + ω1,b) l0 + φ1,b (l1,b)− (1− p2)a1,b (68)
s. t. [1− (1− λ)p2rb] l1,b ≤ [(1− λ)p2vb + ω1,b] l0 +
[
1− η
η
− (1− p2)
]
a1,b, (69)
so that the optimal loan volume lr∗1,b and the expected profit π
r∗
1,b are given by
lr∗1,b = min{lfb1,b, lmax1,η } and πr∗1,b = (p2vb + ω1,b) l0 + φ1,b
(
min{lfb1,b, lmax1,η }
)
− (1− p2)a1,b,
(70)
with lmax1,η := ψηl0 + ξηa1,b, where
ψη :=
(1− λ)p2vb + ω1,b
1− (1− λ)p2rb
< ψ and ξη :=
1−η
η λp2 − (1− p2)
1− (1− λ)p2rb
. (71)
As long as ξη < 0 investing in the risk-free asset a1,b results in a negative expected
profit so that a∗1,b = 0. This implies, however, that the banker cannot issue any new
deposits and the risky mode is technically not feasible.
For all ξη > 0, i.e. for all η <
λp2
1−(1−λ)p2 , a
∗
1,b is determined by
∂πr1,b
∂a1,b
= φ′1,b
(
lmax1,η
) ∂lmax1,η
∂a1,b
− (1− p2). (72)
C.1.2. Comparison
Comparing expected profits, leads to a similar result as Lemma 5. The main difference
is that operating in the risky mode may be restricted by lmax1,η . This results in slightly
different intervals for the respective modes of operation.
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C.2. Second Period (t = 1), Good State
As the LCR imposes no restriction on bank loan supply when operating in the safe
mode, Lemma 6 remains unchanged.
C.3. First Period
C.3.1. Determination of Reduced Forms and Optimal Loan Volumes
C.3.1.1. Safe Mode m = S. As the reduced form is identical to (41) and (42),
strategy A remain unchanged. Strategy BLCR differs from strategy B in the sense
that its upper bound may be larger.
C.3.1.2. Risky Mode m = R. Considering the results of the second period, the
reduced form reads
max
l0,a0∈R+
πR0,η (l0) = φ0(l0)− (1− p1)(1− p2)(µ− p1∆)l0 (73)
+ p1φ1,g(l
fb
1,g) + (1− p1)
[
φ1,b(min{lfb1,b, lmax1,η })− (1− p2)a1,b
]
s. t. l0 ≤
φ1,b
(
min{lfb1,b, lmax1,η }
)
− (1− p2)a1,b
1−(1−λ)p1(µ+(1−p1)∆)
1−(1−λ)p1 − p2(µ− p1∆)
=: lmax0,ηR (74)
with
lmax1,η := ψηl0 + ξηa1,b and ψη :=
(1− λ)p2(µ− p1∆) + 1−(1−λ)p1(µ+(1−p1)∆)1−(1−λ)p1
1− (1− λ)p2rb
, (75)
while ξη is defined in (71).
Strategy CLCR: If (74) is not binding, it follows from (73) that
∂πR0
∂l0
= φ′0(l0)− (1− p1)(1− p2)(µ− p1∆)
+ (1− p1)φ′1,b(min{lfb1,b, lmax1,η })
∂min{lfb1,b, lmax1,η }
∂l0
, (76)
which is equal to zero for lR0,η with l
R
0,η ∈
[
lR0 ,
lfb1,b−ξηa1,b
ψη
]
if ψη > 0 and l
R
0,η with l
R
0,η < l
R
0
if ψη < 0. The optimal loan volume is thus l
∗
0 = l
R
0,η. Applying the implicit function
theorem on the first order condition of πR0,η (l0) with respect to l0 yields that
∂lR0,η
∂∆ is
positive for smaller risks and negative for larger risks.
Strategy DLCR: If (74) is binding, the optimal loan volume is l∗0 = lmax0,ηR with
∂lmax0,ηR
∂∆ < 0.
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C.3.1.3. Failure Mode m = F, Strategy ELCR. As p1 − 1 < 0, see (48), the
LCR will always impose a restriction on the face value of deposits, i.e. δ0 ≤ a0η becomes
binding. Considering this restriction, the reduced form reads
max
l0,a0∈R+
πF0,η (l0) = φ0(l0)− (1− p1)(µ− p1∆)l0 − (1− p1)a0 + p1φ1,g(lfb1,g) (77)
s. t. l0 ≤
1−η
η λp1 − (1− p1)
1− (1− λ)p1[µ+ (1− p1)∆]
a0 =: l
max
0,ηF . (78)
It follows from (78) that this strategy will only be feasible if η < λp11−(1−λ)p1 . In this case,
investing in the risk-free asset loosens the restriction on bank loan supply. However,
this investment corresponds with a negative expected profit, so that a∗0 is determined
by
∂πF0,η
∂a0
=
[
φ′0
(
lmax0,ηF
)
− (1− p1)(µ− p1∆)
] ∂lmax0,ηF
∂a0
− (1− p1). (79)
The optimal loan volume is thus l∗0 = min{lF0 , lmax0,ηF} with
∂lF0
∂∆ > 0 and
∂lmax0,ηF
∂∆ > 0.
C.3.2. Critical Values of ∆
∆Bη , ∆
C
η and ∆
D
η are obtained analogously to ∆
B, ∆C and ∆D, as the indifference
between strategy BLCR and CLCR, strategy CLCR and DLCR, as well as DLCR and
ELCR with
∆Cη :=
[φ1,b(min{lfb1,b, lmax1,η })− (1− p2)a2,b][1− (1− λ)p1]
p1[p2 − (1− λ)(1− p1(1− p2))]lR0,η
+
µ[p2 + (1− λ)p1(1− p2)]− 1
p1[p2 − (1− λ)(1− p1(1− p2))]
. (80)
D. Proof of Proposition 4
The banker cannot raise additional equity once he chooses the risky mode, as share-
holders participation constraint is fulfilled with equality. As the bank might default at
the end of the period, the CDS price becomes positive resulting in a take over and thus
in a negative expected return for the banker. Accordingly, operating in the risky mode
is never beneficial so that the banker will always operate in the safe mode, whereat
bank loan supply might be restricted or not feasible at all.
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